Russian Culture

Center for Democratic Culture

2012

Psychological Culture: Ambivalence and Resistance to Social
Change
Alexander Etkind

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/russian_culture
Part of the Asian History Commons, Cultural History Commons, European History Commons, Other
Languages, Societies, and Cultures Commons, Political History Commons, Slavic Languages and
Societies Commons, Social History Commons, and the Social Psychology Commons

Repository Citation
Etkind, A. (2012). Psychological Culture: Ambivalence and Resistance to Social Change. In Dmitri N.
Shalin, 1-29.
Available at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/russian_culture/5

This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Article in any way that is permitted by the
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself.
This Article has been accepted for inclusion in Russian Culture by an authorized administrator of Digital
Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.

Psychological Culture: Ambivalence and Resistance to Social Change
Alexander Etkind
"National character," "modal personality," "collective unconscious," "ethnic
mentality," "cultural identity" -- these and similar notions are designed to
capture psychological traits that distinguish one social group from
another. Attempts to isolate such hypothetical qualities are not different in
principle from efforts to describe religious, legal, or other social patterns
found among people who have lived together for a length of time, except
that psychological constructs tend to focus on subjective characteristics
and are somewhat harder to identify. [1] For the first time, the link
between culture and psychology came under close scrutiny in the nineteen
century. German linguists Steinthal and Lazarus and psychologist Wilhelm
Wundt made an elaborate case for "Folkpsychology" -- a discipline that
examined the interfaces between folklore, language, social institutions,
and psychological traits. In this century, around the time of World War II,
much attention was given to the so-called "modal personality" and
"national character" that purported to describe the ways in which other
people, often belonging to enemy nations, raised their children and
behaved in their daily life. Margaret Mead, Clyde Kluckhohn, Geoffrey
Gorer, Henry Dick, along with other social scientists, developed a concept
of the Russian national character which sought to explain the
contradictions in the overt behavior of America's arch-enemy in
psychological terms. [2] In the last few decades, scholars began to pay
closer attention to the role that culture and psychology plays in nationbuilding. As economic differences between nations level off, less tangible
cultural characteristics -- emotional, cognitive, aesthetic, axiological -have come to the fore as key factors determining national peculiarities. E.
Gellner put it most provocatively when he said that cultures produced
nations, not the other way around. [3]
As is the case with any other field dealing with human behavior, cultural
psychology has its share of methodological and ideological difficulties. For
one thing, scholars working in this area tend to gloss over considerable
psychological variations within human groups. This is the source of many
questionable generalizations about ethnic psychology, national character,
etc. Complicating the situation, also, are differences in the ways
individuals perceive themselves and the manner they appear to outside
observers. [4] The latter tend to comprehend other people's actions in
terms of their motifs and rigid personality traits, while insiders attribute
their own actions to external circumstances beyond their control. Few

insiders agree with the judgments nonmembers pass on the local mores.
What appears to be odd and problematic for those looking from without,
seems self-evident and natural for group members. When things go awry,
insiders are likely to excuse themselves and blame conspiracy, foreign
interference, or bad luck for their problems. By contrast, an outside
observer is apt to spot bad habits, ingrained inaptitude, or some other
questionable personality traits behind the problems at hand and assign
much responsibility for these problems to group members themselves.
Take, for instance, the Marquis de Custine, a French writer who visited
Russia in 1839, returned from his trip disgusted with what he had seen.
He did not care for Russian customs, but was convinced that the Russians
were to be blamed for their own misfortunes. His conclusion was a
classical case of blaming the victim: "The oppressed have always merited
their sufferings." [5]
This propensity to impugn other people's motifs and exonerate one's own
conduct is the source of many ethnic and racial biases in cross-cultural
perception. Cultural psychology could be employed for pernicious political
purposes. Thus, the Nazis expressed great interest in Carl Jung's theories
about the race spirit and collective unconsciousness. While this fact does
not necessarily disqualify Jung's theories, it calls for caution: cultural
psychology can be used to fan ethnic hatred. [6]
To counter Jung's national-psychology, Freud and his followers developed
a sort of biological internationalism that ruled out any cultural specificity
of mental processes. A. Adler and W. Reich took a keen interest in Marxist
theory and even tried to help the Soviet government employ psychology
in the cause of socialism. Denying any cultural specificity to psychological
phenomena can present its own problems. This century knows several
utopian projects designed to unify all mankind on the basis of common
political (Marxist), mystical (Free Masonery), religious (the Reverend Moon
unification movement), linguistic (Esperanto), and other supposedly
universal qualities inherent in human nature and waiting to be summoned
by skillful manipulation. The manner in which such projects have been
implemented sometimes match the ruthlessness of the politics of racial
and ethnic exclusion. German Nazis and Russian communists might have
entertained opposite views on human nature but relied on the same massscale violence to implement their political schemes. Which brings us to the
central theme of this essay.
There is a difference between "psychology" as an academic discipline and
"psychology" as a shorthand for personality traits common in a given
population. This difference is not especially pertinent when it comes to

traditional, preindustrial societies, which did not evolve their own
psychological science. But in modern societies that have established
psychology as an academic discipline with a strong applied dimension, we
have to deal with a peculiar situation where "scientific knowledge" about
the individual and group psyche is fed back to group members and to
some extent informs their self-perception, if not actual behavior. The case
in point is academic psychology in the Soviet Union that, from the start,
was entrusted with the political task of building the "New Soviet Man" -- a
model personality suitable for a future socialist society. We can speak in
this connection about "psychological culture" by which we shall
understand a set of theories and practices that describe, prescribe and
facilitate the formation of certain cognitive, emotional, and behavioral
traits in a given population. Psychological culture is not identical with the
way concrete individuals feel, think, and act, but it offers them readymade models for self-understanding and thus enters their psychological
make-up. We should bear in mind, also, that the term "psychology" did
not carry the same meaning in the Soviet context as it did in the West.
There was no sharp line separating psychology from other so-called "social
sciences." All these disciplines functioned as branches of "ideology" -- an
overarching field which encompassed political theory, moral philosophy,
historical science, applied psychology, and other subservient domains of
knowledge reenforced by the government propaganda machinery and
penal institutions. To understand Soviet psychological culture, therefore,
we need to take a broader look at the political context within which it
came into existence and was made to serve the system.
In this chapter, I will examine systematic efforts on the part of Soviet
authorities to formulate, shape, and enforce a certain personality type in
the Soviet population. I begin with a brief overview of stereotypes about
the Russian psyche as it appeared to foreign observers, and survey the
precursors of Soviet psychology in prerevolutionary Russia . Then, I shall
turn to the Soviet era and the competing political-psychological projects
for raising a New Soviet Man. Next, I shall analyze the model Soviet
personality envisioned by Stalin and the evolution of this model in postStalinist Russia. And finally, I shall discuss the consequences that the
decades of building the New Socialist Man have had on the current efforts
to form a democratic society in Russia.
Russian Psyche from the Outsider's and Insider's Point of View
Popular stereotypes differ from scientific concepts in at least one
important respect: they are not meant to predict actual conduct and test a
theory. Their main function is to reduce complexity to a neat scheme, to

make understandable odd behavior, and quite often, to disparage
outsiders for their alien ways. Stereotypes are influenced by political
attitudes, artistic accounts, exemplary personalities, as well by the past
and present relationships between the groups to which both an observer
and an observed belong. Notoriously unreliable as guides to understanding
other cultures, stereotypes tell us something important about both the
culture observed and observer's own culture.
For centuries, Russian culture has fascinated people in the West, who
alternatively expressed their admiration and disgust for its inimitable
ways. [7] In modern times, this interest would occasionally take curiously
sexual overtones. Diderot and Voltaire looked up to the Empress Katherine
the Great to realize the Enlightenment ideals. Marx held a life-long
contempt for Russia and its rulers, but shortly before his death, he was so
impressed with the inroads that socialist ideas made in this country that
he set himself the task of learning the Russian language. Nietzsche was in
love with a Russian lady, Lou Andreas-Salome, asked her to marry him,
and, distressed by her refusal, commenced his magnum opus "Thus Spoke
Zaratustra." Carl Jung fell in love with Sabina Spielrein, another Russian
woman, who had a great impact on his personal and professional career.
Stereotypes about the Russian psyche popular in the West ascribe to
Russians a bewildering mix of qualities, such as laziness and hard work,
dependency and disobedience, moodiness and exaltation, mysticism and
realism, shrewdness and impracticality, plus abundant and wild sexuality.
For Madame de Stael, who travelled to Russia in 1812, "in every way
there is something gigantic about these people: ordinary dimensions have
no application to them. . . . If they do not attain their goals it is because
they exceed them." [8] George Brandes, a Danish literary critic, emerged
with a different impression from his 1887 trip to Russia: "[I]ntellectually,
the Russians impress the stranger by their realism, their practical, positive
taste for real." [9] Yet the same author described Russians as "radicals in
everything" and insisted that "when a Russian has got hold of a thought, a
fundamental idea, a principle . . . he does not rest until he has followed it
out to the last results." [10] So much for Russian realism and practicality.
Another (stereo)typical statement comes from a group of Americans
writing under the pseudonym E. B. Lanin, who noted in 1891 that
Russians were "a good-natured, lying, thievish, shiftless, ignorant mass."
[11] Such Western opinions about Russia and the Russians could be
multiplied at will.
This may or may not be a coincidence, but Western intellectuals
promoting radical psychology spent a surprising amount of time pondering

the Russian psyche, as it comes across in the novels of Dostoyevsky and
the country's famous personages (Rasputin is still the most widely known
Russian name in the West). In the process, they revealed much about
their own psyche projected onto the Russians. Some of the most horrid
actions in the novels written by Marquise de Sade (whose father was
Ambassador to Russia ) were committed by Russians. L. Zacher-Masoch,
of sado-masochism fame, was also a great admirer of Russian culture; his
erotic novels were filled with Russian personages and loving descriptions
of Russian sexual mores. Freud, who had many Russians in his Vienna
circle, once noted that "even those Russians who are not neurotics are
deeply ambivalent." [12] His favorite patient, known under the
pseudonym "Wolfman," was a Russian man, who provided Freud with the
model case of primary scene experience and neurotic hyper-sexuality.
Apparently, the founder of psychoanalysis initially felt more comfortable
assigning this psycho-sexual dynamics to exotic Russians rather than to
more staid Austrians.
Contrary to popular view, Russians themselves had mixed feelings about
psychology. [13] "People call me 'psychologist,'" complained Dostoyevsky.
"It's not true; I'm only a realist." [14] Tolstoy wrote pages exposing
psychology as a false science. The Russian literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin
claimed that "every psychologist is a spy." In the early twentieth century,
during the "Silver Age," a period of major cultural developments that
culminated in the Russian revolution, many intellectuals expressed similar
ambivalence about psychology. Vasily Rozanov, an influential literary
figure of this era, thought that Russians did not need any science of
psychology, because inherent in their nature was "psychological
acuteness" -- a natural ability to empathize with others, which could only
be smothered by rational psychology. After describing in his novel the
onset of menses in a young girl, Boris Pasternak made a characteristic
comment that she had no need for psychology, which could lure her away
from the wondrous nature, perfectly capable of running its course without
any aid from psychology. Vasily Ern, a neo-populist philosopher of the first
decade of the century, made a similar point to disparage what he called
"psychologism," which would only restrict the natural flow of subjectivity,
arrest human will, and stop the miracle of immediate psychic action. [15]
There was, of course, another intellectual strand among cultured
Russians, the one that hailed psychology as an indispensable instrument
for understanding the world and coping with social problems. This strand
became more prominent in the 1910s, when chaos gradually enveloped
the country, making more common economic and political explanations
sound increasingly implausible. Zinaida Gippius, a Russian poet, made this

diary entry about revolutionary Petersburg of 1918: "The reality is so
bizarre that it is impossible to believe in facts as they are. Only
psychology provides understanding." [16] More subtle -- psychological -hypotheses were called upon to make sense of a society hurtling into a
political abyss. This movement away from legal-rational schemes favored
by modernity toward more irrational, post-modern explanations is
indicative of the crisis of modernity in Russia and elsewhere in the world
at the time. The depths of human psyche would be plundered in search of
more radical explanations and cures for the ailings of the age.
This turn toward psychology as a handy tool for reshaping human nature
had its important precursors. One of them was Nikolai Fedorov, a Russian
philosopher, who championed a utopian project of future society based on
the principle called "psychocracy" and guided by a new science designed
to make all people genderless and immortal. Odd as it may sound,
Fedorov had many followers in Russia, including Dostoyevsky and Vladimir
Soloviev. As late as the 1930s, Russian emigre political thinkers (P. P.
Suvchinsky was the most prominent among them) swore allegiance to
Fedorov and his philosophical social psychology. Fedorov's project had its
historical counterpart in the psychological-religious program of "skoptsy" - a radical Russian religious sect whose members practiced voluntary
castration of men and de-gendering of women (who had their breasts and
clitoris amputated) as a path to sanctity. Ideas and rituals of this Russian
religious sect curiously adumbrated some cherished bolshevik ideals like
shared property, the end to competition, overcoming of gender
differences, and blind loyalty to the leader. V. Bonch-Bruevich, a friend of
Lenin and the Secretary of his Cabinet, took a life-long interest in Russian
sectarians, apparently hoping to apply their experience to the
monumental tasks facing socialist building.
Psychological Science in Service of Communism
It seems odd indeed that bolsheviks, the standard bearers of Marxism in
Russia , would give credence not to economics and politics but to
psychology as a main leverage for social reconstruction. But in retrospect,
this does not seem to be that surprising. After bolsheviks seized banks,
factories, communications and declared victory, they expected human
behavior change accordingly. But they quickly discovered that political and
economic power was not enough: to change old habits, one had to reach
deeper into human psyche than politics or economics could. This is where
"progressive psychology" came into full view as a queen science called
upon to accomplish the task that the old culture reserved for tradition,
religion, and common sense. Recognizing the failure of the objective

economic and political conditions to effect desired behavioral changes, the
party shifted its hope toward the psychology of hunger, pain, and death.
This psychology was to help the party experts disabuse its subjects of
obsolete beliefs, to reduce each individual to bare physiological reflexes,
and to instil progressive forms of behavior. Bolsheviks insisted that
everything should be planned and nothing remained unconscious. And
they were convinced that the new science of human psyche was to do the
trick.
From before the revolution and throughout the Soviet era, Russian
Marxists were sizing up the new discipline as a useful tool for future
reforms. In their quest for a new psychology, Marxists tapped one unlikely
source: Friedrich Nietzsche. Coming from an entirely different tradition,
this German thinker complemented the native Russian strands with his
thoughts about psychology as a science of the future capable of
revolutionizing the entire society: "[P]sychology shall be recognized . . .
as a queen of the sciences, for whose service and preparation the other
sciences exist. For psychology is now again the path to the fundamental
problems." [17] Bolshevik intellectuals, most notably Trotsky, Bogdanov,
and Lunacharsky, accepted this Nietzschean precept and consciously
sought to splice Marx's socioeconomic utopia with the Nietzschean
psychobiological one. Unlike Nietzsche, they believed that the technical
problems of implementing this idea could be solved within a few years
with the help of psychological science. No, these people were not lunatics,
though in retrospect, at least, they seem to be exceedingly naive in taking
the Nietzschean program at face value. What other Europeans saw as
metaphor and hyperbole, Bolsheviks took as a guide to action.
While the ideological goals were perfectly clear to Russian Marxists, the
practical means were still problematic. However, the optimistic leaders of
the new order considered the task at hand to be a technical one. Neither
Nietzsche nor Marx nor Freud confronted the problem head-on.
Nietzsche's Superman was couched in mythological terms and its arrival
was relegated to a somewhat indefinite future. Marx thought that human
nature would change more or less automatically as soon as the new social
and economic relations were formed. Freud seemed to have relevant
methods, but they were not easy to apply.
"The [new] man hasn't come yet, but he is not far away, and his
silhouette is looming over the horizon," wrote in 1904 Marxist
theoretician, psychiatrist by education, Alexander Bogdanov. [18] "To
publish a new, improved edition of Man," intoned Trotsky, "this is the next
task of communism." [19] The Soviet era's most brilliant psychologist, Lev

Vygotsky, fully concurred: "In new society, our science will be in the
center of life. . . . It will be the last science in the historical period of
Mankind. . . . The new society will make a new human being. . . . This
new science of new man will be nothing else but psychology." [20] An expsychoanalyst, Aron Zalkind formulated in 1929 the main task of the new
psychological discipline as the "mass construction of New Man."
[21] Anton Makarenko, who succeeded Zalkind as a guru of Soviet
psychology, explained the purpose of his "pedagogical science" this way:
"We should take as our task the formation of that type of behavior, those
characters and qualities of personality, which are necessary for the Soviet
state." [22] The eugenics -- a biological science of breeding a better
human specimen -- also drew a passing interests of Bolsheviks. In the
mid-20s, Nikolai Koltsov, a brilliant researcher whose studies received full
support from the authorities, sought to apply genetic methods for the
artificial selection of future mankind. Ilya Ivanov, a biology professor,
petitioned the Ministry of Education (Narcompros) with a more radical
idea: the cross-breeding of African apes and Russian citizens. His proposal
was approved and financed by the government, which gave Professor
Ivanov hard currency and sent him to Africa . This was done at the time
when Ivan Pavlov, a Noble prize winning physiologist, had no food to feed
his experimental dogs. [23] The program of building the New Soviet Man
would be continuously adjusted in its technical details, but its main thrust
remained unchanged throughout the Soviet era. Years after Stalin's death,
a prominent Soviet philosopher, Evald Ilenkov, restated the original
program as follows: "Formation of the personality of the new, communist
type man on a mass scale . . . now becomes a practical task and the
immediate goal." [24]
Implementing the ambitious program for educating a new man required
extensive logistical arrangements. The Civil War was not yet over, but the
spectacular institutional buildup in psychology had commenced. Six times
more students registered as "pedagogic" majors in 1921 than in 1914. In
1922, Moscow alone sported over twenty institutions devoted entirely to
research and higher learning in psychology and pedagogy. [25] Four
federal ministries -- of Education, Health, Railways, and Heavy Industry -had their own pedological services. In 1923, the Russian Psychological
Association, the Russian Psychoanalytical Association, and the Russian
Association for Experimental Psychology opened up in Moscow . In 1927,
the Moscow Testing Association was formed, along with the All-Russian
Psychotechnical Association and the Soviet Pedological Association, which
had their first Congresses the same year. This bloated establishment
helped the Communist party select leaders, place people in appropriate

positions, and improve their natural abilities. [26]
Human Nature and Bolshevik Culture
The term "human nature" generally connotes stable biological and
psychological traits beyond social control. In this sense, "nature" is
opposed to "culture." This usage, which goes back to Rousseau, is very
common in liberal and skeptical discourse. Freud referred to human nature
each time he wished to make a point how difficult it was to change man
and society. Radical thinkers and totalitarian politicians valued psychology
more than liberal ones. If you think that human nature is a constant and
more or less perfect, you need no radical psychological intervention to
make it better. Thus, F. A. Hayek rejected Freud, Skinner, and psychology
in general as a tool for social reconstruction. [27] The more one despairs
about human nature and wants to see it ameliorated, the more likely one
is to invest in psychology. Radical psychology and radical politics went
hand in hand throughout this century. For political extremists, human
nature was not a nature anymore; rather, it was equated with culture and
reduced to an underlying socio-historical context. What was made by
history, the radicals surmised, could be remade in the new historical
circumstances through conscious efforts. Understood in such a fashion,
human nature presented itself as suitable object for political manipulation.
More and more it would appear to Soviet theoreticians as just another
word for human culture. This transformation of the familiar nature-culture
construct [28] infinitely enlarged the scope for radical intervention in
human affairs and offered endless creative possibilities for the early
twentieth century Russian intellectuals.
Since economic determinism proved rather helpless in affecting the
human psyche, Bolsheviks turned to behavioral science for theoretical
concepts and technical solutions that could complement Marxism. For all
these thinkers, human nature appeared to be a culture in disguise, an
infinitely malleable substance ready for social amelioration. Such was the
broad ideological consensus that united otherwise different thinkers of this
period. Said Vygotsky, "When we speak about the melting ( pereplavka)
of man as a quality unquestionably required by the new mankind, about
the artificial selection of the new biological species, we are dealing with a
truly unique situation: man is the first and only biological species that
makes itself." [29] "Psychotechnique" was among the most popular words
of the epoch. Each major theorist construed it in a somewhat different
way, but they all believed in the magic of "scientific" transformation to be
accomplished with an aid of a well-tested psychological tool. For L.
Vygotsky, it was "concept," for T. Lysenko -- "genes," for N. Marr --

"language," for A. Makarenko -- "groups." Responding to the official
critique of his pedology, Zalkind sought to reassert his political
credentials: "I always worked to prove an extraordinary sociogenic
conditionality and plasticity of human behavior." [30] In 1931, Zalkind
attempted to formulate the principles that would become the
methodological canons for Soviet psychology, which included "activity,"
meaning that personality should be studied as an active and not a merely
contemplative being, and "plasticity," implying that human nature was
"not a warehouse" of ready-made traits but a store of dynamic
potentialities.
Trotsky's ideas were especially informative in this context. "Man is purging
himself from top to bottom; he purged himself from God, State, and the
Tsar, he freed economy from chaos and competition and is now purging
his inner world from the unconsciousness and darkness." [31] Effortlessly,
Trotsky crossed the line between the commonplace and utopia, economy
and psychology, Marxism and Freudianism. Everything inherited from the
past was to be "purged" from top to bottom. It was not long before
Trotsky discovered that the metaphor of "purging" could be applied to him
as well. While still in power, Trotsky sought a shortcut to the bolshevik
scientific utopia via psychoanalysis. He became familiar with the field
during his Viennese emigration in 1908. Adler and his wife were his
personal friends; he attended psychoanalytical meetings and left
remarkable memoirs on this subject. In 1931, Trotsky sent his own
daughter to Berlin to undergo psychoanalytic treatment. His disciple,
friend, and life-long collaborator, Adolph Ioffe, was a patient of Adler. In
September 1923, Trotsky wrote a letter to Ivan Pavlov advising him to
synthesize his physiology with Freudian psychoanalysis. Both Pavlov and
Freud, Trotsky reasoned, looked in the same well of human spirit,
although Freud did so from above and Pavlov from below. Trotsky's
passion for psychoanalysis was infectious, as attested by the creation in
1923 of the State Psychoanalytic Institute in Moscow. At the same time,
the Russian Psychoanalytic Association had more top Bolsheviks as board
members than professional psychoanalysts. Yet, this institution for
psyching the New Soviet Man into existence did not survive Trotsky's
political downfall. [32] We might add in passim that Trotsky's link to the
psychoanalytic circles had an ironic and rather dark side. Naum Eitingon,
head of Stalin's counterintelligence service who personally supervised
Stalin's plot to assassinate Trotsky's, had an indirect link to the
psychoanalytic establishment: his brother and business partner, Dr. Max
Eitingon, was President of the International Psychoanalytic Association.

Stalinist Psychology and the Psychodynamics of Soviet Power
Like several other projects favored by Trotsky, this one was first rejected,
then simplified, and finally put into action by Stalin. With the downfall of
psychoanalysis and with encouragement from Stalin, "pedology" took its
place as the chief psychological theory. Aron Zalkind became its official
leader. An ex-psychoanalyst, he was the author of the unbelievably
restrictive "New Sexual Commandment of Proletariat." Pedology,
supported by Bukharin, Krupskaia, and Lunacharsky, had its boom around
1930. Many psychoanalysts and psychologists, among them Sabina
Spielrein in Rostov and Lev Vygotsky in Moscow, found refuge in its
immense staff. In 1936, pedology was rejected by the Party and replaced
with Makarenko's "pedagogic." Makarenko's normative vision for the New
Soviet Man followed the familiar bolshevik blueprint. He was to love work
for its own sake, be unswervingly devoted to the communist cause, and
enthusiastic about any assignments that the party might give him. The
transformation of an ordinary human into a model Soviet citizen must be
radical and swift. The New Soviet Man's psyche would enable him to
believe in the incredible, to endure the unbearable, to love things people
normally hate. Sexual libido had to be reduced to a minimum along with
other human needs, so as not to dissipate the individual's energy on trivial
pursuits. Interpersonal feelings should give the way to "collectivist"
identifications. Aggression and competitiveness would be neutralized in
everyday life and reactivated when the country had to fight its foreign
enemies. We can summarize the quasi-scientific concept of human nature
and psychology espoused by Soviet theoreticians of this era as follows:
(1) Human nature is far from perfect; its spontaneity is dangerous; like
children, human beings should be kept under constant supervision; they
require guidance and firm direction from knowledgeable adults.
(2) Human nature is not fixed, but plastic and malleable; it can be
changed in a methodical way; people, like children, are open to the
molding influence of environment, culture, and society.
(3) Transforming human nature is a complicated task; its ultimate aims
and scientific procedures might not be fully understandable to the
uninitiated; political education is the job for highly skilled and ideologically
astute professionals.
(4) Human beings owe their essence to society; the transforming power of
society is vested in social groups or "collectives"; a suiting paradigm for a
collective is an army unit or a labor team; family, peer groups, or other

primary group formations do not qualify as collectives.
(5) Concepts and words are primary psychological phenomena; personal
experiences are verbally recoverable; the verbalization of personal
attitudes is to be encouraged to facilitate official monitoring; nonverbal,
unconscious, uncontrollable psychological processes are to be stamped out
by the scientific manipulation of the human psyche.
Not to be outdone by Trotsky, Stalin professed himself a proponent of
"scientific psychology." [33] It was with his approval that psychology was
added to the school curriculum as a mandatory discipline -- an
unprecedented measure that remained in effect until Stalin's death. With
Stalin solidifying his power over the Communist party and the country, the
blueprint for raising a New Soviet Man changed somewhat. It was
becoming even more rigidly ideological and, at the same time, more
personalized. Elaborate networks of personal relations sprang up, without
which nobody could successfully exercise power and climb up in the
hierarchy. One is tempted to compare this tangle of political, economic,
and personal relations to the operations of a mafia family. To be sure, the
members of the latter do not seek to take over the entire society; they
pray on society at large rather than try to transform it from scratch, as
the bolsheviks set out to do. But there are some instructive similarities,
nonetheless. They are apparent in the sustained efforts to impart the
organization's ethos to its younger members, initiation rituals symbolizing
the individual's dedication to the organization, emphasis on personal trust
and undivided commitment to the leader, relentless power struggle and
endless fights for a position closest to the chief de jour, readiness on a
moment's notice to cut old ties and rededicate oneself to a new power
configuration. Learning these rules by heart was as much a condition of
success as a matter of survival for those caught in this deadly game.
The mafia-like pattern of personal bonds was reproduced at all layers of
power in Stalin's Russia . Each ministry, industry, army unit, work team,
office, or scientific division identified with its chief -- a role model for his
subordinates. A trusted comrade, such an exemplary individual would
have the job done through the sheer strength of his character. A strong
leader could accomplish the task even without technical expertise, as long
as he possessed the right psychological stuff [34] . Strong will,
intimidating demeanor, and heavy hand expected from a person aspiring
for a leadership position in Soviet society.
Not surprisingly, the parent-child relationship became the paradigm for all
social ties under Stalin's rule. Stalin's image was drummed into the

nation's psyche as a paradigmatic father figure, while Lenin was widely
perceived as a grand-father of sort. Freud also noticed this pattern of
leader-follower relationship, which he thought to be common to all
politics. In the West, though, such psychological mechanisms were not
altogether apparent; rather, they represented a fairly sophisticated
analytical construct. In Stalin's Russia , on the other hand, people openly
declared their love for the nation's padre familia. A Soviet professor could
praise Stalin-the-father leading his grateful citizen-children to a bright
future, and nobody in the audience would see anything wrong with this
locution.
"Some people say that thoughts appear in the human mind before they
are uttered, outside of language, naked so to say," opined Stalin in a
broadside against Freudian Marxists and all wayward psychologists,
linguists, and philosophers interested in the notion of unconscious. "It is
absolutely not true. Whatever thoughts man might have exist only on the
language foundation, on the foundation of the language terms and
phrases. There are no thoughts naked and free from the language
material." [35] This strategic idea perfectly suited Stalin's totalitarian
political aspirations. During his reign, anything that eluded ideological
control and resisted correct political formulation was to be barred from
existence, or at least from psychological textbooks. There is nothing in the
human mind that is closed to the party's watchful eye, that could not be
revealed and corrected. Society, or which is the same thing for Stalin,
power, is in a position to program and reprogram human psyche.
Whatever man conceals from himself, he conceals from the authorities. To
postulate anything unreadable and unrecoverable in the human psyche
was to doubt the party's omnipotence. This precept survived many
transformations in Soviet psychology and remained central in the works of
such diverse thinkers as Lev Vygotsky, Alexey Leontiev, and Evald
Ilienkov. Thinking was nothing else but inner speech, and concepts were
interiorized social hierarchies.
Nature as Culture: Dimensions of a Metaphor
Gender, aging, death -- all natural phenomena that could not be readily
squeezed into an ideologically correct schema were suspect in Soviet
psychological culture. The fact that the high ideological discourse
systematically ignored the low bodily functions did not mean, of course,
that the latter were wished away. Hidden in the interstices of an
omnipotent culture were the incorrigible facts of human nature that kept
intruding into life in spite of all the efforts the sanitize it, to purify it from
natural imperfections. Thus, Soviets never managed to abolish death;

when a person died, the rituals of grieving and burial were performed, just
as they were centuries before the October Revolution. Despite repeated
attempts, no cultural forms pertaining to birth, marriage, or burial rituals
emerged in the Soviet Union that bore an unmistakable imprint of Soviet
ideology. The latter failed to leave any noticeable traces because the
human life cycle had no recognized place in Soviet ideology. Ideology had
a lot to say on how humans should live, work, struggle, cherish
motherland, but nothing at all on how they should go about giving birth
and facing death.
Compromises with nature were only temporary; ultimately, culture would
overcome its inertia and make every bodily function follow a correct
ideological blueprint. What follows is an attempt to codify some of the
most salient characteristics that Soviet culture sought to impart to human
nature, an ideal type of fully realized Soviet being toward which Soviet
citizens were to move under the guidance of their spiritual leaders.
Power as supreme value. Human needs and values are many, but so far
as Soviet ideology was concerned, none came close in importance to
acquiring power, wielding power, enjoying power. Power was more
important than love, respect, and health. It was to give more pleasure
than family, creativity, and sex. The reason for this imperative was
simple: power guaranteed its owner access to all other values. Education,
career, friendship, economic security, and sexual pleasures could be
exchanged for power, measured through a proximity to the party and
state leaders. Luxurious (by Soviet standards at any rate) life awaited
high officials -- summer cottages, limousines, opera lodges, ostentatious
food feasts, the company of artistic stars -- just about anything, except
private property banned by Stalin. With the power base lost, the person
would have to give up everything of personal value. The "cult of power"
had a its psychological counterpart "the cult of personality," which Nikita
Khrushchev denounced as the essence of the Stalinist political system. In
the words of Bourdieu, [36] all forms of capital -- economic, cultural,
psychological -- correlated with and derived from political capital in Soviet
society. The case of Stalin's henchman, Lavrenty Beria, comes to mind,
his fabled sexual exploits being greatly aided by his powerful position as
head of the Soviet secret police.
The Soviet authorities' uncompromising attitude towards private property
and independent cultural pursuits makes perfect sense in this context, for
these could not help but undermine the party faithful's monopoly on
power and sever the link between the place a person occupies in the
political hierarchy and the amount of pleasures meted out to this person.

Of course, there are values that are difficult or impossible to redistribute,
like health, youth, and physical beauty. The latter belong to nature, which
place severe limits on what could be done through cultural manipulation to
enhance them. Which is why the Communist party perceived such values
as a threat to its total power. Unable to control these values, the regime
methodically sought to devalue them in the public mind, deprive them of
their traditional cultural meaning. Biological universalities and constants of
human existence were given new cultural interpretations undercutting
their natural significance.
The subject as absence. Power was there to be wielded and enjoyed, but
not conspicuously, for it did not belong to any particular individual.
Contrary to the "cult of personality" thesis, Soviet power was not vested in
a person; it came from the state and the party, whose comrades had to
exude modesty and reticence and act as conduits for its collective wisdom.
Trotsky showed too much personal ambition, which violated the
Bolshevik's cherished beliefs. He acted like a master seducer conquering
the feminine crowd, to use the image Freud employed in his essay on
"Mass psychology." Trotsky's comrades never forgave him his charisma
and mass appeal and ditched him at the first opportunity. By comparison,
Stalin, was a paragon of modesty and collegiality. His demonstratively
noncompetitive style in public suited well the spirit of the time. All top
Soviet leaders had to suppress their ambitions and appear to the populace
under the mask of humble servants of the state. Carefully planned and
consciously constructed, Soviet power was modelled not so much on
sexual conquest as on a long bureaucratic climb by leaders who proved
themselves in the office, showed respect for their organization and its
ethos, and were finally rewarded with the mantle of leadership.
The subject, the flesh and blood human being was conspicuous for its
absence in official Soviet life -- the fact reflected in the Soviet political
speech. People were not supposed to say "I"-- only "We." The plural form
"We" implied an infinite number of other comrades who would have said
the same thing under similar circumstances. Passive voice and impersonal
forms are ubiquitous in Soviet political jargon. "It is proposed that . . .," a
typical sentence would commence, leaving the uninitiated wonder who is
exactly proposing. English language does not quite capture such
subjectless grammatical constructions so pervasive in Russian speech.
Maybe some languages are better equipped for power play than other,
though any language could be twisted to convey power symbolism.
The Soviet leader was always a symbol, standing for something other than
himself, embodying the idea of Soviet power, and subject to instant recall

whenever he failed to communicate the proper message to his underlings.
A replica of power rather than a self-motivated agent, the leader served
not as a prototype but a monument to be worshiped in lieu of the original.
It would be unseemly for a portrait, a replica, a copy to speak out on its
own behalf. In fact, the original was power itself, and the Soviet state
could be seen as a shrine in which citizens worshiped power.
The psyche as discursiveness. The New Soviet Man had to be a supremely
discursive creature, capable of verbalizing his innermost feelings and
thoughts. No event of his psyche should have escaped notice -- his own
and other responsible comrades. Psychological processes were to be
recovered through speech. To control is to know, to know is to verbalize.
Which is why confession qualified as the ultimate proof in Soviet legal
practice. True, the confession might have been extracted by torture, but
then pain and suffering, being nonverbal psychic events, were
meaningless in themselves.
The emphasis on discursiveness did not improve the quality of verbal
production in the Soviet Union . The Soviet leaders's verbosity went hand
in hand with their inarticulateness. To an extent, this was true of the
Soviet people in general. [37] The content of speech meant little
compared to the fact that someone was authorized to speak publicly, to
voice an opinion. Public ceremonies -- from the Communist party
congresses to meetings of local party cells -- were transformed into
endless verbal exercises. Speeches were tedious, speakers repeated each
other, there was little hard information presented to the audience, but
that was beside the point. What really mattered was who got to the
podium, in what order, for how long, etc. From all that an experienced
observer could instantly infer the speaker's place in the pecking order, his
closeness to the higher-ups, the amount of political capital at his disposal,
and so forth. Generally, the more often a person spoke in public, the more
importance people assigned to him. In his waning years, handicapped by
numerous illnesses, Brezhnev felt obliged to give six-hour long speeches
before the national audience, making the uneasy viewers wonder if he
could survive the ordeal.
Speaking took a precedence over writing in Soviet society. Those who
wrote speeches were invariably lower in the social hierarchy than those
who gave them. Published work also had a lower status than public
speaking. Intellectuals engaged in writing and publishing wielded minimal
political power. Their skills would bring them a decent living, but with very
few exceptions (Maxim Gorky comes to mind here), Soviet writers did not
ascent to the pinnacle of power and were never deified as Soviet political

leaders given to public oratory.
The right to voice an opinion in public was reserved for trusted comrades.
Common folks had the right -- and duty -- to demonstrate their approval
for the leaders and their public pronouncements. Characteristically, the
very idea of democracy is linked in the Russian language with
speech: golosovat -- to vote -- in Russian literally means "to practice
voice." People deprived of the voting rights in the '30s due to their
bourgeois origins or similar political indiscretions were referred to as
"deprived of the right of voice." Gorbachev's campaign for openness -glasnost' -- was construed as regaining of voice and encouraging
unauthorized speech.
Body as pain. Soviet art often featured heroic deeds and titanic efforts in
which individuals struggled, went through much suffering, and overcame
pain to achieve worthy goals. It is much harder to find in it the
representation of pleasure. Eating, dreaming, having sex -- any activity
that did not pursue a public agenda and that could be enjoyed for its own
sake was suspect. Soviet psychological culture was allergic to pleasure.
The familiar Soviet formula: "With the feeling of deep satisfaction it is
stated that. . ." hints at this ascetic sentiment, an aversion to pleasure.
There is no grammatical subject in this verbal cliche. It is not the speaker
who feels satisfaction; whatever positive emotions are registered here,
they have nothing to do with the human body. Soviet citizens were
expected to be motivated in their endeavors by a sheer enthusiasm for a
collectively approved goal. Heroism Soviet style consisted in the
overcoming human nature and acting as if body did not matter, as was
the case with the famous war veteran pilot who took to the air to pursue
enemy airplanes after loosing his legs in a battle. A common scene in
Soviet war movies featured a proud soldier or resistance fighter refusing
to give out state secrets while tortured by fascists.
To be sure, the body stripped of its natural functions, immune to
pleasures, and desensitized to pain, was only a cultural metaphor. People
never stopped eating, imbibing, defecating, copulating, just as they
continued to love and dream and think silly thoughts. It is amazing,
Pasternak once said, that amidst all this madness, people still could have
normal dreams.
Death as silence. A voiceless individual was much less of a threat to the
state than the one who did not surrender this party-given gift. A careless
joke, a complaint about working conditions, an approving reference to
genetics -- any statement that did not meet with official approval could

cost an individual his voice. And when the party wanted to silence
individuals permanently, it deprived them of their body, as well. A dead
body is a silent body. In Soviet society, death commonly appeared as the
ultimate form of censorship imposed on the discursively incorrect citizens.
Any strong voice that stood out from the chorus and sang an unfamiliar
tune was in danger. That is, unless this voice belonged to the beloved
leader, like Lenin or Stalin, in which case death was but a temporary
impairment to be rectified by the advancement of Soviet science. There
are more than just ideological-propaganda reasons why the bodies of the
deceased leaders in the Soviet Union were preserved in the best possible
conditions. This practice goes back to the early Bolsheviks who, like the
pre-revolutionary skoptsy and visionaries like Federov, entertained serious
hopes that one day the mortal comrades could be brought back to life.
The mausoleum on the Red Square in Moscow where the bodies of Lenin
and Stalin were placed after their death is a monument to this quest for
immortality.
As to the rank and file builders of communism, they had to face death on
their own, unaided by official guidelines about its meaning or prospects of
life after death. The nearly total absence of grieving rituals or even simple
explanations pertaining to death in official Soviet culture is stunning. The
political leaders did not fair much better in this department: they
repeatedly revealed themselves unprepared for death, leaving the nation
without a clue about its future and setting in motion protracted fights
between potential successors for the leadership mantle.
Age as power. Consider the ageless portraits of Soviet leaders. The
authorities detested aging as a natural biological process immune to
cultural manipulations. Determined efforts to overcome aging were
mounted in the 20s, when a surgical procedure for rejuvenating testicles
became popular among some bolsheviks, but the efforts apparently failed.
Ever since, bolsheviks chose to ignore aging as a phenomenon worthy of
serious attention. Childhood, youth, old age -- these natural stages in the
human life cycle were virtually unknown to Soviet ideologists and, for a
ling time, down-played by scientists. Nobody outlawed age differences,
but the latter had not been given a positive account as distinct stages in
personal growth. Childhood and youth had value as transitory periods
allowing humans to practice their future roles as adult citizens. Agespecific subcultures had been suppressed. Soviet youth had significantly
less peer-group interactions than their counterparts in the West, and
whatever experience they had was frowned upon by adults. For a long
time, the country had no discernable youth fashion or holidays geared for
children. Medical facilities for children were inadequate and counseling

agencies nonexistent. By the same token, the authorities made no
concerted efforts to build facilities for elderly people, to insure
handicapped people's access to public areas, etc. Adulthood emerged here
as a supreme value and a power base. Whatever the age of Soviet
leaders, however infirm they might appear, they were hailed as productive
adults.
Gerontocracy is a pattern commonly found in non-democratic polities, but
few modern societies pressed it as far as Soviet rulers. The latter
continuously exhorted the younger generations to become more
ideologically vigilant, economically efficient, and socially correct. In fact,
most of the talk about the New Soviet Man was addressed by elderly
leaders to the country's youth. Such officially approved organizations as
the Oktobrists, the Young Pioneers, and the Young Communist League
replicated the Communist party organization and adhered in their
practices to adult values and tastes. Mandatory military service provided
one official outlet where Soviet youth engaged in what seemed like agespecific activities, but its heavy ideological indoctrination, sadistic initiation
rituals, and brutal disciplinary practices turned it into a powerful
mechanism for instilling rigid collectivist principles in Soviet youth. In fact,
the armed forces duplicated the age bias found in Soviet society at large,
as senior conscripts were allowed to brutalize at will their junior comrades.
Gender as maleness. Officially, Soviet ideology tended to minimize gender
differences. Men and women were expected to subscribe to the same
values and beliefs, have the same psychological qualities, and engage with
the same enthusiasm in building a future society. In practice, however,
gender-based inequality pervaded Soviet society. People in power were
predominantly males. The dominant culture in society was produced by
males and for males. Women labored as hard as men did, but they had to
carry a double burden -- at work and at home. In a way, women were
allowed to stay closer to nature than men, as they continued to give birth,
care for children, prepare meals, and do other things in the natural life
cycle that could not be abolished by official decrees. Women worked in
agriculture, education, or as general practitioners in medicine, leaving to
men the areas of cultural creativity, industrial production, and military
service. Males' alienation from nature was self-imposed; they were
perfectly happy to let women take care of such natural functions, while
they concentrated on cultural pursuits. As a result, the cultural violence
unleashed by bolsheviks consumed more men than women. It is this
closeness to nature that helped women survive the madness of Soviet
civilization better than their male counterparts.

The End of Stalinism and the Transformation of Soviet Psychology
As an instrument of social change, violence was practiced since times
immemorial by people subscribing to disparate ideological agendas. In
recent times, the Nazis used it extensively to exterminate undesirable
political (communist), racial (Jews and Gypsies), and sexual
(homosexuals) groups. Those were narrowly targeted groups supposedly
impeding the transition to a glorious state of the future. This very
predictability of violence gave to the untargeted German citizens the
sense of security. What made Stalin's terror different and profoundly
affected the Soviet psyche was its randomness. Nobody was immune from
purges; any person or group was a potential target and had to submit its
share of sacrificial victims on the altar of power.
There was no way to predict who the next victim would be. Sometimes
verbal violence preceded physical violence, as was the case with the
political trials unleashed during the campaign of mass terror in 1936.
Other times, verbal attacks hinting at incarceration and death failed to
inflict the expected damage. Thus, the vociferous campaign against
pedology and its practitioners ordered by Stalin in 1936 stopped short of
arrests and executions. In still other cases, deadly violence was applied
without any verbal warning. The person and whole ethnic groups could
vanish one day from their homes and sometimes from the face of the
earth, as did Jewish writers in the late 40s and Crimean tartars during the
World War II, to name just a couple examples. It was the sheer
randomness of violence that infused Soviet people with unimaginable
horror and left an indelible mark on their psyche. If fear is an expectation
of punishment and guilt is the internalization of this expectation, then the
Soviet psyche was permanently afflicted with both. Most people knew that
they could be punished and felt guilty ways before they were actually
accused of any wrongdoing. Soviet propaganda, in turn, worked over time
to ensure that every person remained vigilant and ready to meet his fate
if need be. Big terror without systematic deception would be a mass
murder. Propaganda without terror would amount to a massive lie. But
deception and violence working in tandem created a new psychological
reality in their victims. The two reenforced each other and supported the
system, which would have collapsed without these props. And when the
Soviet regime gave up on random terror and concentrated mostly on
deception as an instrument of social control, it doomed itself to an
imminent demise.
Changing adults' behavior is complicated business. Witness all the efforts
to alter eating, drinking or sexual habits, which are met with only

marginal success. The chief stumbling block here is that humans are
expected to change their mind-sets and behavior while their environment
remains basically the same. Moving an obese person into a famine area
would surely produce dramatic results in reducing the person's weight.
Moreover, attitude and behavior modification accomplished in such a
dramatic manner often meets with less psychological resistance than the
change that is supposed to be entirely voluntary. If people in Stalin's
Russia adapted to the ideological demands without much resistance and
even felt nostalgic about Stalinism, it is in large measure because the
psychological changes sought by the regime were reinforced by drastic
environmental changes, the total mobilization of resources, and the
massive use of violence.
Having renounced Stalinist methods, Soviet leaders had to place even
greater emphasis on psychology, propaganda, and agitation. A slate of
Stalin's successors, with the possible exception of Khrushchev, fancied
themselves psychological vizards and touted their administrative and
public relations skills as an asset in implementing the scaled down
communist agenda. Brezhnev is reported to have bragged to his buddies
that he might be weak in economics but that psychology and the art of
governing were his strong suits. Chernenko, Brezhnev's successor, tried to
reanimate the moribund Soviet society with yet another crack at
"communist upbringing" and "instilling right values" in Soviet youth.
Andropov, the ex-KGB chief, was a recognized master of deception. But
the efforts to achieve change without violence, by relying chiefly on
rhetoric and deception, proved to be a failure. When ideological vitriol and
politically correct ranting are no longer followed by actions, punitive or
otherwise, they lose their persuasive power and sooner or later start
ringing hollow.
This is what happened in the post-Stalinist era, when the level of verbal
violence visibly escalated but the authorities' ability to move people
around vastly diminished. Beginning the late 50s, the monolithic
psychological culture began to give way to the one dominated by doublethink. In public, people still had to convey their enthusiasm for socialism,
appear to be hard working, show moral fiber, exhibit genderless qualities,
etc. But in private life, they could think and behave pretty much as they
pleased, as long as they did not let their private actions spill over into the
public arena. The opposition between nature and culture transformed itself
into the opposition between the public and the private. Culture reigned
over the public sphere, nature took over private life. In contrast to the
public sphere where transactions grew excessively formal and ritualized,
private life promoted unusually close emotional ties, which flourished

undisturbed by envy and competition under the conditions of forced
egalitarianism. Emotional bonding, personal commitment, aversion to cold
calculations, the penchant for improvisation, and life-long friendships grew
especially prominent among the intelligentsia. In private settings, Soviets
often seemed to have preferred singing to speaking, perhaps because
music entailed a strong nondiscursive element. These characteristics
would be strikingly apparent to Western visitors, who learned to
appreciate the company of intellectuals and emotional intimacy of the vast
interpersonal networks that sprang to life in post-Stalinist Russia .
But there was a price to be paid for these seemingly congenial and
nonutilitarian personal bonds. The gap between word and deed, a deep
contempt for the system and a forced public silence bred hypocrisy and
encouraged self-hatred. When the gap would become intolerable and the
person dared to voice his dissent in public, the authorities moved to
silence the nonconformist. Even if the person did not resemble a new
Soviet man in his private life, he still had to pretend to be one in his public
appearances. The handful of dissidents who openly dared to challenge the
Soviet system found this out the hard way. After denouncing Stalin's
violence, Khrushchev and his successors did not shy away from the old
punitive ways, even though they hesitated to practice violence on a mass
scale and never dared to reintroduce random terror. From that point on,
only public dissent would be a punishable offence.
Psychology was fully institutionalized as an independent academic
discipline in post-Stalin's Russia . The first psychology departments were
established in the Moscow and Leningrad State Universities in 1964, a
generation before the first sociology department was created in 1986. The
discipline's premises remained more or less unchanged. "Our entire nature
might be constructed," wrote Aleksey Leontiev, a leading psychologist of
the this period, "and this is especially true about the psychological nature
of man." [38] In his early research, Leontiev tried to show that humans
can be taught to discriminate colors by touch. His findings were never
confirmed, but Leontiev remained convinced throughout his life that
human nature was an infinitely malleable social construct that could be
made and remade at will. Another prominent Soviet thinker, Evald
Ilienkov, expressed similar convictions that the human psyche could be
shaped according to an ideological blueprint. He sought to prove his thesis
through a study of congenitally blind-deaf-mute individuals, whose
progress he guided and monitored for a number of years. The results
seemed impressive: several of his subjects enrolled into the Moscow State
University and successfully completed their undergraduate education. "In
spite of the obstacles that seemed insurmountable -- the complete and

innate absence of both vision and hearing -- it was shown possible to . . .
shape a highly sophisticated human psyche." [39] His sensational theories
fell apart, however, when his subjects confessed that their defects were
not congenital but acquired between the ages of four and six. [40]
A more sinister role in shoring up the official lies was accorded to Soviet
psychiatry. Its chief exponent, Dr. Snezhnevsky, came up with an idea
that political dissent in Soviet society was usually an indication of
psychiatric abnormalities. He discerned the early signs of schizophrenia in
the patients who "develop an odd . . . interest in abstract problems and
harbor naive ideas about their resolution. In particular, [such patients]
spend much time reading philosophical, psychological, sociological, and
aesthetics treatises." [41] This doctrine rationalized the psychiatric abuses
in the Soviet Union , the long-standing practice of institutionalizing
political dissidents, labor organizers, religious activists, and simply
independently minded people who refused to acknowledge the party line
and dared to voice unauthorized views in public. Consciousness that failed
to acknowledge Soviet reality in all its official glory was pronounced
delusionary and subjected to medical treatment. The plight of dissidents
committed to psychiatric facilities was in many ways worse than that of
dissidents thrown to prisons, for as patients in psychiatric wards dissidents
were isolated from normal human beings and had to endure the
application of mind-altering drugs. They could also be kept in mental
asylums indefinitely. There was a way for a patient to get out of the
psychiatric prison: he had to renounce incorrect views and embrace the
official line. Again, the healthy psyche was equated with discursiveness,
the ability to spout right verbiage, the eagerness with which one was
willing to present ideologically correct precepts as personal convictions.
Wearing pious masks in public and cursing the regime in private would
become a norm. Pervasive double-think could not help leaving its mark on
the Soviet psyche. One of its insidious consequences was alcoholism that
afflicted high-brow intellectuals and common folk alike. In the intoxicated
state, Soviet citizens could transcend the fundamental duality of their
being and achieve the unity of mind and action which the mendacious
realities of everyday life denied them in their sober moments. This was
also a way, however fleeting, to break through culture and reach out to
nature inside and outside oneself.
By the early 80s, the New Soviet Man's existence was as threadbare as
that of the senile Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, whose barely
functioning body was kept alive by valiant efforts of doctors and faith
healers. A cultural construct that came to life in extreme historical

conditions and required mass terror to prop it up, the New Soviet Man
transpired as a pathetic monster whom nobody took seriously any longer,
not even experts from the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, who
kept themselves busy propagating the familiar nonsense but for all
practical purposes ceased agitating the populace. Soviet citizens
contemptuously referred to the New Soviet Man as "Sovok" -- a little
shovel handy for collecting dust or absorbing ideological garbage. Such
was the ignominious end of the communist superman -- Homo Sovieticus
-- that Trotsky and his comrades dreamed about at the dawn of Soviet
civilization.
Conclusion: the Unbearable Lightness of Human Nature
Among the causes contributing to the demise of the Soviet empire one
has to count the psychological crisis that gripped Soviet society in the
early 70s and wore it down through the 80s. Apathy, cynicism, and
alcoholism had as much to do with the collapse of the Soviet regime as
the falling prices on world oil markets and corruption among Soviet
officials. Mikhail Gorbachev set out to lead the country out of its malaise
and managed to breath some new life into old political forms. But in the
end, perestroika failed to deliver on its promise, and not just because its
architect was too slow to jettison obsolete ideological schemes, but also
because he underestimated the depth of anger that enveloped Soviet
society after its cherished myths were exposed.
There were people who found postcommunist reality to their liking, but
most cringed. The deadlocked political process, the wavering economic
reforms, and the mounting chaos in daily life left many feeling nostalgic
for the certainties of the bygone era. The break-up of the Soviet empire
had a particularly strong effect on the Russian psyche. Even people
detesting communism were troubled by the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the nation's loss of its superpower status. From the psychological
viewpoint, ex-Soviets found most upsetting the diminished sense of
security and the sudden loss of personal identity. However arduous life
was under the ancien regime, it accorded the individual a place in the
social system, guaranteed employment, minimal standards of living, free
health care, a chance to get ahead for those willing to play by the rules,
and the sense that one belonged to a great nation. With wild capitalism
replacing cradle-to-grave security, many people were frightened by the
revolutionary forces they helped unleash. Blue and white color workers
now faced unemployment; intellectuals found their spiritual bonds
threatened by inequality; artists lamented the lost state subsidies for art;
the once pampered military forces saw their prestige take a nose-dive;

collective farmers felt reluctant to strike on their own as private
producers; and nearly everybody felt the void inside. To fill this void,
some turned to the discrete pleasures of private enterprise, others sought
refuge in nationalism and religion, still others vowed to bring back the
good old days of socialism and restore the Soviet empire to its glory days.
Everyone has to master the difficult art of private living, with all its
headaches, uncertainties, and opportunities. But identities, like new
shoes, do not always fit. People are still groping for a self they could be
proud of or at least comfortable with. Hopes are riding high for a
miraculous cure that could deliver the country from its present morass
and reinvest personal life with meaning. One indication that people are
vying for a quick fix is the spreading hatred toward minorities who are
blamed for current problems. Another -- the proliferation of psychics and
future tellers in Russian society. Anatoly Kashpirovsky, an immensely
popular faith healer who made his name during the late perestroika era,
was invited by Vladimir Zhirinovsky to run as a representative of his socalled "Liberal Democratic" party. Kashpirovsky agreed and was elected to
the Russian Parliament. More sound liberals gathered around Yeltsin yearn
for a miracle of their own -- the miracle of a free market. Yet the liberal
idea that the free market would speedily transform the Soviet psyche into
something more benign proved to be as misplaced as the radical claim
that the socialist economy would deliver a new man. Which brings us back
to the question of human nature in its relation to culture.
In the previous sections, I examined the blueprints for the New Soviet
Man, the techniques used to implement it, and the outcome of efforts to
engineer a communist social species. The Soviet experiment was based on
the assumption that human nature was flexible, malleable, passive -- that
it was shaped anew in each historical era according to specific cultural
blueprints. Indeed, human behavior could be influenced by social forces
and changed on a mass scale, provided the efforts are reenforced by the
total control over society and its members. But all such efforts are
predicated on the willingness to use both violence and deception. As soon
as the powers begin to let up on violence, humans recoil from extremes
and revert to more common attitudes and actions. Even under extreme
conditions, people are likely to change their habits rather than their
motifs, their ideological verbiage rather than their bodily functions, their
cultural forms rather than their natural desires. What Soviet experience
appears to teach us is that revolutions against human nature are doomed.
Culture might disguise nature but it could not abolish it altogether. This is
not to gainsay that sex, gender, family, and work patterns bear a distinct
historical and cultural mark, only that the variability in these patterns is
limited by the universalities of human nature. For all the resources that

the Soviet regime put into modifying human conduct, it had very little to
show for its efforts. Soviet citizens emerged from the historical
experiment that began in October of 1917 demoralized, but they have not
lost their ability to love, to laugh, to kibitz, to hope. With time, they will
form new habits to satisfy their basic needs. I do not know how the
Russian psyche will evolve in the next few decades, but I am convinced
that the Russian citizens will resist the temptation to succumb to yet
another overarching ideological blueprint for a happy future.
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